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We examine whether a stimulus generalization framework can provide insight in how 
experience shapes evaluative responses to artworks. Participants received positive information 
about one artwork and negative information about another artwork. Afterwards, we tested 
their evaluative responses not only to these artworks but also to similar artworks, which 
allowed us to assess generalization. Results showed that the artwork that was paired with 
positive information and the artwork that was similar to it were evaluated more positively 
than the other artworks. These findings confirm that theories that aim to explain art 
appreciation could benefit from taking learning and its generalization into account.  




























Like what you see: Generalization of social learning determines art appreciation 
Evaluative responses determine many aspects of our daily life, including the company 
that we keep, the products that we buy, and the food that we eat (De Houwer, Thomas, & 
Baeyens, 2001). Not surprisingly, scholars have long tried to understand the origins of these 
responses (Martin & Levey, 1994; Zajonc, 1980). One domain in which evaluative responses 
can be especially puzzling is that of modern and contemporary art, which has been argued to 
be inaccessible and difficult (Wolfe, 1975). 
We examine whether a generalization framework can provide insight in how 
experience shapes evaluative responses to certain artworks. Investigating the role of 
experience has long remained an unmet challenge in psycho-aesthetics, since the dominant 
strategy has been to seek for universal laws which link variations in stimulus features to 
variations in evaluation (Martindale, 1990; Ramachandran, 2001; Redies, 2007). Although 
this strategy has a long history that can be traced back to ideas about the golden ratio or divine 
proportion (e.g., Pacioli, 1509), most theorists now do acknowledge that experience (e.g., in 
the form of familiarity and training) has considerable influence (Jacobsen & Beudt, 2017; 
Pelowski, Markey, Forster, Gerger, & Leder, 2017; Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004). 
However, exactly how the influence of experience plays out is still left unexplored. The 
generalization of acquired evaluation from one stimulus to other but related stimuli provides 
one straightforward principle of how experience might shape evaluative responding. 
Generalization of negative evaluations has previously been demonstrated in the aversive 
learning domain (Boddez, Bennett, van Esch, & Beckers, 2017). For instance, a dark grey 
square (i.e., a generalization stimulus or GS) can come to elicit dislike due to a learning 
experience in which a black square was followed by electric shock (i.e., a conditional stimulus 
or CS; Boddez et al., 2017; Dymond, Dunsmoor, Vervliet, Roche, & Hermans, 2015; 
Ghirlanda & Enquist, 2003; Hermans, Baeyens, & Verviet, 2013). It is as if the negative 
evaluation acquired by the black square spreads out to similar stimuli. However, the 
generalization of positive evaluations has rarely been investigated (FeldmanHall et al., 2018; 
Verosky & Todorov, 2010; Zizak & Reber, 2004) and in particular not with artworks as 
stimuli. 
In summary, the generalization framework entails that an acquired evaluation will not 
remain specific to the stimulus at hand but will affect the evaluation of related stimuli as well. 
Interestingly, generalization allows to anchor several ideas and observations about art 
appreciation in a unifying framework. Below, we substantiate this claim with some examples.  
First, the sometimes-observed more positive evaluation of figurative art relative to 
abstract art (Lindell & Mueller, 2011; Van Paaschen, Bacci, & Melcher, 2015) can be 




understood as an instance of generalization in case that the figurative artwork depicts — and 
therefore is similar to — already liked things (e.g., an actual landscape which is lovely). In 
such case, transfer of the positive evaluation is indeed expected according to the 
generalization principle.  
Second, it has been hypothesized (Loewy, 1951) that people tend to like art and design 
which is not too different from what they already know and like. An intuitive example is the 
popularity of remixes or sampling in which elements of an original song are taken and altered 
(example from Hekkert, 2006). More anecdotally, this can also be recognized in people liking 
the whole oeuvre of a certain artist or even complete art movements, since similarity within 
an oeuvre or movement is typically high. Both these phenomena are in line with an 
empirically established moderator of generalization: The strength of generalization effects is 
inversely related to physical distance from the original stimulus. So, the more similar a GS is 
to a CS, the more transfer of responding. For example, in the study discussed above, a dark 
grey square elicited more dislike than a light grey one after the black square was followed by 
electric shock (Boddez et al., 2017). Making the leap to the domain of aesthetics, a piece of 
art which remains closer in similarity to an already liked artwork would be predicted to elicit 
more liking than a less similar one.  
Third and in the same vein, generalization can even shed light on the evolution of art 
history. It has been argued that artistic styles that differ a bit – but, importantly, not too much 
– from what is mainstream are typically highly appreciated and hailed as the “new thing” 
(Wolfe, 1975). The bull series by artist Roy Lichtenstein (Figure 1), which comments on this 
gradual evolution of mainstream styles, illustrates this idea: The realistic bull (lower right 
panel) has little features in common with the abstract bull (upper left panel), but the cubistic 
bull (lower left panel) bridges the gap between the two. Generalization allows to explain this 
pattern. An artistic style that is still similar to an already appreciated style will be appreciated 
as well. With a few intermediate steps, one can, however, end up with a style that seemingly 
has nothing in common with the original style. 
 





Figure 1. Bull series by Roy Lichtenstein. 
All the above still leaves open the question of where initial evaluative responses come 
from and how the positive evaluation of the intermediate steps is further augmented so that it 
can move along to increasingly different artworks. Learning theory can rely on several 
learning principles here, such as (further) mere exposure (e.g., through media; Zajonc, 1969) 
and social learning (Rachman, 1977). Social learning is especially relevant for our present 
purposes. Art is part of one’s sociocultural surroundings and people share their reflections 
orally or in written reviews, which provides ample opportunity for this type of learning.  
In the present study, we therefore paired artworks with positive or negative messages 
provided by experts. Given a wide literature on persuasive messages (De Houwer & Hughes, 
2016; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999; Wood, 2000) and a previous demonstration that such 
procedure can install art appreciation (Lauring et al., 2016), we figured that this would 
provide us with robust initial learning that would allow to assess subsequent generalization of 
evaluative responses. The experiment started with an evaluative learning phase, in which 
participants received positive information about one artwork (CS+) and negative information 
about another artwork (CS-). To enhance ecological validity, we used pictures of artworks 
that are relevant in today’s art market (Hayn-Leichsenring, 2017). We hypothesized that 
participants would rate the artwork about which they received positive information as better 
than the artwork about which they received negative information. Crucially, they also had to 
rate a first additional artwork that was similar to the one about which they received positive 
information (GS+) and a second additional artwork that was similar to the one about which 
they received negative information (GS-). This allowed us to assess the generalization of 
evaluative responses. In addition to asking participants to rate the different artworks, we also 




measured evaluative responding to these artworks indirectly using the Evaluative Priming 
Task (EPT; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). This task requires participants to 
categorize target stimuli as positive or negative as quickly as possible. Each target is preceded 
by a prime stimulus for which the evaluation is under investigation (in this study, the CSs and 
GSs). There is evidence showing that categorization of the target is faster when the prime and 
the target are affectively congruent compared to when these stimuli are affectively 
incongruent (Fazio, 2001; Herring et al., 2013). Accordingly, we used the speed with which 
participants categorize positive as compared to negative targets as an indication of automatic 
evaluative responding towards the CSs and GSs. 
Method 
Participants  
Twenty-four participants (18 women), between 19 and 60 years old (M = 28.58 years, SD = 
12.46 years), were recruited through an online system that allows both people from the 
community and students to sign up for experiments. The incentive for participating was either 
a financial reimbursement of 10 euro or a course credit. All participants gave written informed 
consent. Sample size was determined in advance based on within-group comparisons in 
previous evaluative conditioning studies (e.g., Boddez et al., 2017). Participants were 
assigned to one of the two counterbalancing groups in an alternating manner. The protocol 
was approved by the social and societal ethics committee at KU Leuven and carried out in 
accordance with the provisions of the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki. 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
Participants were tested in individual sessions on a Dell desktop computer with a CRT 
monitor. Affect 4.0 software (Spruyt, Clarysse, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2010) 
was used to control stimulus presentation and register responses.  
In the rating phase, we used eight artworks, with dimensions varying between 297 by 
600 pixels and 512 by 600 pixels. In counterbalancing condition 1, the CS+ was an artwork 
by Dirk Braeckman, named M.R.-P.O. (top panel of Figure 2), and the CS- was an artwork by 
Francis Bacon, named Study for head of Lucian Freud (bottom panel of Figure 2). In 
counterbalancing condition 2, this was reversed. The GS for the artwork by Dirk Braeckman 
was an artwork by Daisuke Yokota, named Untitled (top panel of Figure 2), and the GS for 
the artwork by Francis Bacon was an artwork by Adrian Ghenie, named Selfportrait as 
Vincent Van Gogh 2 (bottom panel of Figure 2). The remaining four artworks functioned as 
filler stimuli and were by the artists Michaël Borremans (The prop), Marlene Dumas (The 
painter), Geert Goiris (Dead bird) and Wolfgang Tillmans (Dürerstrasse). 




To account for pre-existing individual differences, participants rated a series of 
artworks before they came to the experiment. This pre-rating survey was administered online 
with the help of LimeSurvey service and included the same eight stimuli used in the 
experiment and 10 additional filler artworks. These additional artworks varied between 263 
by 532 pixels and 399 by 600 pixels and were by the following artists: Fred Bervoets 
(Hommage aan Van Gogh), Ellen De Meutter (Selfportrait 2), Marlene Dumas (Destino), 
Karin Hanssen (The approach), Gideon Kiefer (You got up the tree, so you can get down), 
Sophie Kuijken (Untitled), Hervé Martijn (The distance), Laurent Millet (Somnium), Gerhard 
Richter (Frau mit Hund am See), and Mircea Suciu (Still life).  
During the EPT, a response box with two keys was used to categorize the targets. 
Targets were six positive pictures (i.e., baby, dog, cat, waterfall, dolphin, sunset) and six 
negative pictures (i.e., car-wreck, fire, skull, worms, barbed wire, trash) with a dimension of 
512 by 384 pixels. These targets were selected on the basis of norm data collected in previous 
research (Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2002). Primes consisted of the two CSs, the 
two GSs, and one neutral picture (i.e., a triangle on a gray background). During the practice 
trials, primes were three geometric figures on a gray background (i.e., circle, square, 
rhombus). 





Figure 2. The artwork on the top left is by Dirk Braeckman (Courtesy Zeno-X gallery, 
Antwerp) and was used as a CS+ in counterbalancing condition 1 and as a CS- in 
counterbalancing condition 2. The artwork on the top right is by Daisuke Yokota (Courtesy 
Stieglitz 19, Antwerp) and was used as its GS in both counterbalancing conditions. The 
artwork on the bottom left is by Francis Bacon and was used as CS- in counterbalancing 
condition 1 and as CS+ in counterbalancing condition 2. The artwork on the right is by Adrian 
Ghenie (Courtesy Tim Van Laere Gallery, Antwerp) and was used as its GS in both 
counterbalancing conditions. 
Measures  
(Pre-)rating. During the online survey that was completed at home before the start of 
the experiment and during the rating phase of the experiment, participants were asked to 
evaluate the artworks on a scale ranging from 0% (very bad) to 100% (very good). 
Evaluative Priming Task (EPT). The EPT measured the reaction time to categorize 
the target pictures as positive or negative.  




Similarity. Participants rated the similarity of pairs of stimuli used on a scale ranging 
from 0 (not similar at all) to 10 (very similar). More precisely, they were asked how alike the 
artworks were.  
Expertise. To assess their level of expertise, participants were asked to answer two 
questions about the artworks they had seen during the rating phase. The first question 
concerned whether they had already seen the artwork before participating in the study. The 
participant could answer this with ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘not sure’. The second question asked 
whether they knew the artist who made the artwork, which they could answer with ‘no’ or the 
name of the artist. An expertise score was determined by giving one point for every artwork 
they had seen before, 0.5 point for every artwork of which they were not sure if they had seen 
it before, and one point for every correct artist name.  
Procedure 




Essential elements of the procedure  
Pre-rating (very 
bad to very good) 
Evaluative 
learning 
Rating (very bad 
to very good) 
Evaluative 
priming task 
Similarity ratings Expertise 






CS+ & positive 
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Note. Participants received positive information about one artwork (CS+) and negative information about 
another artwork (CS-) in the evaluative learning phase. Afterwards, we tested evaluative responding to these 
artworks and to two artworks similar to them (respectively GS+ and GS-) by means of a rating scale and an 
evaluative priming task. With respect to the rating data, we calculated the difference between post-ratings and 
pre-ratings to account for pre-existing differences. At the end of the experiment, participants rated the similarity 
of each CS with the two GSs and were tested for their expertise in art.  
 
After signing up for the study, participants received an e-mail with a link to the online 
pre-rating survey in which they were asked to rate artworks for the first time. These artworks 
were the eight artworks that were also presented during the rating phase and the 10 extra filler 
artworks described above. Participants were instructed to fill out this survey between 12 to 24 
hours before the start of the actual experiment. The stimuli were presented in a random order.  




The experiment started with the evaluative learning training. Participants were told 
that they would have to rate artworks and that, as an example, they would first view two 
artworks accompanied by the evaluation given by experts as found on Artnet (a metacritic 
website about art). In fact, these example trials were the crucial learning trials. Participants 
were shown four trials in a random order: two times the artwork by Francis Bacon and two 
times the artwork by Dirk Braeckman (see Figure 2). On each trial, the artworks were 
accompanied by the mean rating and reviews of either an expert group of art dealers or an 
expert group of other artists. One of the two artworks was given a positive mean rating (i.e., 
87% and 93%) and review by both expert groups, while the other artwork received a negative 
mean rating (i.e., 8% and 12%) and review by both expert groups. Each review consisted of 
three positive words / statements (i.e., intense, suggestive image, good complexity, timeless, 
intriguing, strong imagery) or three negative words / statements (i.e., grotesque, boring, banal 
portrait, stylistically outmoded, too commercial, something you would put on a postcard). The 
manipulation was counterbalanced: In the first counterbalancing condition, the artwork by 
Braeckman received a high rating by both expert groups (i.e., the CS+) and the artwork by 
Bacon received low ratings (i.e., the CS-), while the inverse was true in the second 
counterbalancing condition. Each artwork appeared for 30 seconds together with the rating 
and reviews placed underneath. To enhance the effect of the manipulation, the ratings and 
reviews were read aloud by the experimenter. 
Participants were then asked to rate different artworks themselves, including the CSs 
(artwork by Dirk Braeckman and by Francis Bacon), the GSs (artwork by Daisuke Yokota 
and by Adrian Ghenie) and the four filler stimuli described above. Artworks appeared on the 
screen one by one in a random order. Participants indicated their rating on the scale and 
pressed the space bar to proceed to the next trial.  
Subsequently, the EPT was administered. Each trial started with a 500-ms presentation 
of a fixation cross followed by a 500-ms blank interval, after which the prime was presented 
for 200 ms. The target was presented 50 ms after the offset of the prime. Participants were 
instructed to look at the prime and to categorize the target as quickly as possible as positive or 
negative by pressing respectively the right or left key of the response box. A trial ended when 
a response key had been pressed or after 2000 ms had elapsed. The inter-trial interval varied 
semi-randomly between 500 and 1500 ms, with an average set to 1000 ms. The task started 
with 12 practice trials during which each target was presented once in combination with one 
of the three geometric figures serving as primes. The actual priming trials were divided into 
two blocks separated by a reminder to continue categorizing the targets as quickly as possible. 
In each block, each of the five primes (i.e., CS+, CS-, GS+, GS-, geometric figure) was 




combined with each of the twelve targets (i.e., six positive pictures and six negative pictures), 
resulting in 60 trials per block that were presented in a random order. After this task, 
participants rated the targets on a scale ranging from -10 (very negative) to 10 (very positive) 
in order to verify their intended positive or negative evaluation.  
During the next phase, participants rated the similarity of each CS with the two GSs 
and the four filler stimuli. Artworks were presented in pairs on the computer screen in a 
random order. Participants rated their similarity on the scale and pressed the space bar to 
proceed to the next trial. A successful manipulation would point out that (a) the artworks by 
Adrian Ghenie and Francis Bacon look more similar to each other than the artworks by 
Adrian Ghenie and Dirk Braeckman, and that (b) the artworks by Daisuke Yokota and Dirk 
Braeckman look more similar to each other than the artworks by Daisuke Yokota and Francis 
Bacon. 
Finally, to assess participants’ pre-existing expertise in art, they were instructed to 
indicate whether they had already seen the eight artworks of the rating phase before the onset 
of the experiment and to write down the names of the corresponding artists. The artworks 




To account for pre-existing individual differences in evaluative responding, we decided 
before the start of data collection to calculate the difference between post-ratings and pre-
ratings for the CS+, the CS-, the GS+, and the GS-. We then performed a repeated measures 
ANOVA on these difference scores with two within-subjects variables: intended evaluation 
(positive for the CS+ and the GS+ versus negative for the CS- and GS-) and stimulus type 
(CS versus GS). Figure 3 shows that the CS+ and the GS+ were rated higher than the CS- and 
the GS-, as hypothesized. The analysis confirmed the presence of a significant effect of 
intended evaluation, F(1, 23) = 5.98, MSE = 360.42,  η²p = .21, p = .023. This effect of 
intended evaluation did not differ between CSs and GSs, as indicated by the absence of an 
interaction effect between stimulus type and intended evaluation, F(1, 23) = 0.03, MSE = 
202.73, η²p = .00 , p = .859. There was no significant difference in ratings between the CSs 
and the GSs, as indicated by the absence of an effect of stimulus type, F(1, 23) = 2.82, MSE = 
4688.99, η²p = .11 , p = .107. 
 






Figure 3. Mean difference scores for the CS+, CS-, GS+ and GS- (see main text for details). 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Evaluative Priming Task  
The method of data pre-processing and all exclusion criteria were determined beforehand and 
based on Descheemaeker, Spruyt, and Hermans (2014). The manipulation check at the end of 
the EPT indicated that participants rated the positive targets as significantly more positive 
than the negative targets, Mpositive = 7.5, SDpositive = 0.4, Mnegative = -7.5, SDnegative = 1.2, Welch 
t-test: t(5.9) = 28.35, p < .001. However, one participant rated a negative target as neutral, so 
all trials with this target were excluded for this participant. We also excluded trials on which a 
target was categorized incorrectly (3.2% of all trials), trials on which no response was given 
before 2000 ms had elapsed (0.2% of all trials), and trials with a reaction time of 100 ms or 
less (0.1% of all trials). To reduce the impact of outlying variables, we excluded response 
latencies that deviated more than 2.5 standard deviations from a participant’s mean latency for 
each trial type (e.g., trials with the CS+ as a prime followed by a positive target; 2.5% of all 




trials). Based on the remaining trials, we calculated mean response latencies for each trial type 
per participant.  
These mean response latencies were analyzed by means of a 2 (prime type: GS versus 
CS) x 2 (intended prime evaluation: positive for the CS+ and the GS+ versus negative for the 
CS- and GS-) x 2 (target evaluation: positive versus negative) repeated measures ANOVA. A 
test of the interaction between intended prime evaluation and target evaluation resulted in 
F(1,23) = 3.90, MSE = 1199.97,  η²p = .15, p = .061. Although this p-value is just above the 
commonly employed significance level of 5 per cent, the data pattern was partly in line with 
our hypothesis when considered at a mere descriptive level. As can be seen in Figure 4, 
participants categorized positive targets more quickly than negative targets when they had 
first been presented with the CS+ or the GS+. In the case that the CS- or GS- had been 
presented first, this difference in speed of responding was less pronounced. However, in this 
case, we did not see a full reversal of the pattern of responding as compared to when the CS+ 
or GS+ had been presented first though (i.e., participants were not faster to categorize 
negative as compared to positive targets). This lack of a full reversal might be because 
priming effects are generally stronger for positive stimuli (Unkelbach, Fiedler, Bayer, 
Stegmüller, & Danner, 2008) or merely because EPT scores tend to be relatively low in 
reliability (Van Dessel, Mertens, Smith, & De Houwer, 2017).  
The absence of a significant three-way interaction effect between prime type, intended 
prime evaluation, and target evaluation, F(1,23) = 0.06, MSE = 909.13, η²p = .00, p = .803, 
indicates that the interaction between intended prime and target evaluation was not different 
for CSs as compared to GSs. Needless to say, this three-way interaction needs to be 
interpreted with caution given that the p-value of the interaction between intended prime and 
target evaluation was above the commonly employed significance level.  
For the sake of completeness, we still report the main effect of prime type (i.e., CS 
versus GS), F(1,23) = .01, MSE = 5,  η²p = .00, p = .93, of intended prime evaluation (i.e., 
CS+ and GS+ versus CS- and GS-), F(1,23) = .07, MSE = 213,  η²p = .00, p = .80, and of 
target evaluation (i.e., positive versus negative targets), F(1,23) = 9.21, MSE = 22639,  η²p = 
.90, p = 0.01. 
 





Figure 4. Mean response latencies in ms during the Evaluative Priming Task (see main text 
for details). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Similarity 
Similarity ratings of each CS with each GS were analyzed by means of a repeated 
measures ANOVA with one within-subjects variable (similarity: similarity between Francis 
Bacon and Daisuke Yokota, between Dirk Braeckman and Adrian Ghenie, between Francis 
Bacon and Adrian Ghenie, and between Dirk Braeckman and Daisuke Yokota). Figure 5 
shows that the artworks that were supposed to look similar were actually rated as more 
similar. The results indeed revealed a significant effect of similarity, F(2.12, 48.75) = 49.96, 
MSE = 241.83, η²p = .68, p < 0.001. Follow-up tests confirmed that the artworks by Francis 
Bacon and Adrian Ghenie looked more similar than the ones by Dirk Braeckman and Adrian 
Ghenie, F(1,23) = 126.23, MSE = 3.52, η²p = .85, p < 0.001, and that the artworks by Dirk 
Braeckman and Daisuke Yokota looked more similar than the ones by Francis Bacon and 
Daisuke Yokota, F(1,23) = 30.79, MSE = 8.79, η²p = .57, p < .001.  
 









Descriptive statistics for the expertise scores were M = 0.65 and SD = 1.15. The 
highest expertise score was 2.5 (this participant indicated having seen one of the artworks 
before the start of the experiment and was not sure if he/she had seen three of the other 
artworks before). None of the participants could state the name of an artist who created one of 
the artworks used during the experiment. We can conclude that there were no experts among 
our participants.  
Discussion  
We hypothesized that evaluative responses to artworks could be installed by providing 
verbal information about these artworks. Crucially, we hypothesized that this learning effect 
would also generalize to other, similar artworks. The rating data confirmed our hypotheses. 
Participants rated the CS+ and the GS+ as better than the CS- and GS-. At a descriptive level, 
the pattern of the EPT data corroborated this finding, as the time needed to categorize a target 
was moderated by whether either a CS+ or a GS+, on the one hand, or a CS- or a GS-, on the 
other hand, preceded it. However, the p-value of the corresponding interaction remained just 
above the commonly used significance level of 5 per cent.  
In line with the assumptions of the functional-cognitive framework (e.g., De Houwer, 
Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2013), we have to differentiate between the functional and the 
cognitive level of analysis when interpreting these results. At the functional level, we found 
evidence that information about artworks affects the evaluative responses to these and related 




artworks. At the cognitive level, this effect could be mediated by different candidate 
mechanisms such as the formation of associations between the positive/negative words in the 
reviews (e.g., “powerful”, “good”, and “intriguing” versus “boring”, “banal”, and 
“outmoded”) and the artwork (for such a proposal see Gast & De Houwer, 2012), inferences 
made by the participants regarding the plausibility and trustworthiness of the expert reviews 
(De Houwer, 2018), or even with experimental demand. With respect to experimental 
demand, two arguments are worth considering. First, it is of note that the EPT which we used 
is considered to be insensitive to control strategies that could lead to demand effects 
(Gawronski, Mitchell, & Balas, 2015). The convincing power of this first argument will of 
course depend on how convincing one finds the data pattern obtained with this task. Second, 
effects of experimental demand presuppose the existence of a straightforward desired 
response. Arguably, the present research design involves a certain degree of ambiguity: 
Participants might infer which response is expected to the CSs, but it might not be so 
straightforward to infer which response is expected to the GSs. 
The analyses for the rating data were performed on difference scores between post-
ratings and pre-ratings. The (on average) negative difference scores suggest that participants 
tended to give higher ratings in the pre-rating phase (which was completed at home before the 
start of the experiment) than during the rating phase of the experiment. We can only speculate 
on why this is so. It could have to do with the context (home versus in the laboratory) or with 
rating the artworks for the first versus for the second time. Some could consider the latter an 
unlikely candidate-explanation, because repeated exposure has often been linked to more 
positive evaluations (mere exposure and fluency effects; Berlyne, 1970; Van de Cruys, & 
Wagemans, 2011; Zajonc, 1969). 
The generalization findings suggest that the impact of an evaluative learning 
experience can spread out to other stimuli: Positive or negative information about one artwork 
can affect one’s evaluation of similar artworks. This is in line with conditioning models that 
predict generalization to stimuli that share perceptual features with the original CS (e.g., 
Pearce, 1987). These models assume that a stimulus is composed of multiple perceptual 
elements that can each, to a certain degree, be associated with an outcome (e.g., an electric 
shock or a positive message). Accordingly, GSs can activate the outcome representation to the 
extent that they are composed of elements that are also part of the CS (e.g., Pearce, 1987; 
Rescorla, 1976; but see Boddez et al., 2017). It is of note that in the present study the 
generalization effect may be driven by perceptual features concerning style (e.g., color 
palette) and / or content (e.g., shape of a head versus of a body).  




It is hereby important to note that the current design cannot ascertain that similarity 
between artworks is driving the congruent evaluation of CSs and GSs. The similarity ratings 
at the end of experiment do suggest this but provide no causal evidence. However, it is not 
immediately clear what the common ground between the CSs and GSs that were evaluated 
congruently would be if not similarity. In addition, given the broader literature on 
generalization, we would argue that it seems more likely that similarity drives evaluative 
responses as compared to, for example, the other way around. In generalization studies with 
stimuli that are initially neutral and arbitrary (so not artworks), physical distance (and thereby 
presumably similarity) is manipulated by testing stimuli that vary systematically over some 
stimulus dimension (e.g., intensity of sound/light, orientation, object size, etc.; Ghirlanda & 
Enquist, 2003). Evaluative responses to these stimuli have been observed to vary as a function 
of distance of the original CS (Boddez et al., 2017), suggesting that similarity causes 
congruent evaluation (of initially neutral stimuli), rather than the other way around. 
Although it is possible that the current results are specific to the used stimulus 
materials, we consider this unlikely given that generalization has proven to be a robust 
phenomenon in several domains other than art appreciation (Dymond et al., 2015; Ghirlanda 
& Enquist, 2003). It would nonetheless be advised to expand the stimulus set in future 
research. Adding more GSs would also allow to assess whether there would be a decline in 
positive evaluation of artworks that become increasingly more dissimilar. The strength of 
generalization effects is indeed known to be inversely related to physical distance from the 
original stimulus (Dymond et al., 2015; Ghirlanda & Enquist, 2003). 
Another suggestion for future research is to assess generalization across non-
perceptual dimensions. In the present study, the CS and the GS were perceptually similar. 
However, in daily life, art appreciation also seems to spread across non-perceptual 
dimensions. People might, for example, like all artworks from a certain time period or all 
artworks sold by a certain prestigious art dealer (Wolfe, 1975), although there might be little 
perceptual overlap between these artworks. Different procedures from the learning tradition 
are highly relevant for understanding and studying this type of generalization. These 
procedures offer a venue for an induction of equivalent classes of stimuli, that is, sets of 
completely arbitrary stimuli, bearing no perceptual relation, that nevertheless may support 
within-class generalization (Hermans & Baeyens, 2013; Hughes, De Houwer, & Perugini, 
2016). Future research could make use of these procedures to further our understanding of 
generalization of art appreciation along conceptual similarity dimensions as well.  
A phenomenon related to generalization is peak shift. Simply put, the peak shift effect 
concerns a shift of peak responding away from the CS+ in the direction opposite of the CS–. 




For example, in a fear conditioning procedure, if a small circle is followed by a shock and a 
big circle is not followed by a shock, an even smaller circle will provoke more fear than the 
small circle that was actually followed by the shock (Struyf, Iberico, & Vervliet, 2014). In art, 
one could assume, for example, that if abstract art is made positive and a figurative art is 
made negative (e.g, because of a trend in reviewing among art critics), even more abstract art 
will be evaluated as even more positive. Although this principle is considered to be important 
in explaining evaluative responses to specific artworks (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999), it 
has not yet been investigated in this context (Leder et al., 2004). Since the occurrence of peak 
shift presupposes the occurrence of generalization, our study can be seen as an incentive to 
look into peak shift effects in follow-up studies on art appreciation.  
In summary, we demonstrated that generalization can help us understand how 
experience shapes evaluative responses to artworks. Instructed art appreciation spread out to 
similar but different artworks.  
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